We analyze the possibility of the simultaneous presence of two key features in pricetaking sequential economies: collateralized credit operations and effective additional enforcement mechanisms, i.e. those implying payments besides the value of collateral guarantees.
Introduction
In modern financial markets, collateral guarantees play an important role in enforcing borrowers not to entirely default on their financial promises. These guarantees are used in several credit operations, from corporate bonds to Collateralized Mortgages Obligations, 1 allowing markets to reduce credit risk and increase portfolio diversification. However, to protect investors from the excess of losses induced by large negative shocks in the value of collateral guarantees, financial markets may create and implement additional enforcement mechanisms against default. In this paper, we focus on the theoretical effects of such a policy on the agent's maximization problem and, consequently, on the price-taking credit market.
In the infinite horizon context, the incentives provided by the collateralization of financial contracts are mostly addressed when the only enforcement mechanism against default is the seizure Date: April 08, 2009. We are indebted with Filipe Martins-da-Rocha for suggestions on previous versions of this paper. We thank Marcelo Abreu, Helen Harris, Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Paulo Klinger Monteiro, Emma Moreno-García and an anonymous referee for useful comments. T. Ferreira acknowledges support from CNPq-Brasil. J.P.Torres-Martínez acknowledge the financial support of Conicyt (Chilean research council) through Fondecyt project 1090206. of the associated guarantees. 2 Particularly, for incomplete market economies, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) prove the existence of equilibrium independent of the choice of collateral guarantees. One important consequence is that such simple financial structure keeps the credit market from collapsing. Essentially, since agents default only when the value of the collateral requirements is smaller than that of the respective financial promise, the net payoff of lending is always less than or equal to the one associated to holding the amount of the required collateral. Therefore, by the absence of arbitrage, the value of any loan has to be less than the value of the respective collateral, precluding agents to become leveraged and eliminating Ponzi schemes.
However, Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have shown that the results above may not hold when linear utility penalties for default act as an additional enforcement mechanism besides the seizure of collateral guarantees. 3 They provide examples of deterministic economies where sufficiently harsh penalties induce agents to fully honor their debts, paying more than the depreciated collateral, which, by non-arbitrage, may lead the value of collateral requirements to be persistently lower than that of the loan. In such a context, given any budget feasible plan, agents may improve their utilities by taking new loans, constituting the associated collateral guarantees and increasing their consumption. Therefore, there is no individual's optimal plan and we cannot define a credit market.
In this paper, we analyze how the interaction between collateral guarantees and generic additional enforcement mechanisms can extend the result from Páscoa and Seghir's particular examples to more general economies. Doing so, we identify the effectiveness of these additional mechanisms as an important economic concept responsible for the result. Additionally, we argue that two new features of our approach enable us to reach further conclusions than the ones already presented in the literature. First, instead of using a general equilibrium framework, we only analyze the decision problem of one agent. Second, we work with a reduced form approach to model the inclusion of additional enforcement mechanisms against default.
Focusing on the maximization problem of a price taker agent in an economy analogous to that studied by Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), we introduce effective additional enforcement mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms enforcing payments besides the value of the collateral guarantees. We represent these additional mechanisms by their effectiveness on enforcing payments besides the value 2 Related literature. The inclusion of collateralized debt in a general equilibrium framework was originally studied by Geanakoplos (1997) and Geanakoplos and Zame (2002 of the collateral requirements. Thus, we do not intend to explicitly model how the market imposes additional payments on borrowers besides the value of collateral guarantees. However, with this reduced form approach, we can concentrate on the pricing and market effects of these additional mechanisms. In fact, we derive an explicit relationship between the primitives of the economy, such as the effectiveness and collateral requirements, implying the collapse of the agent's maximization problem.
Essentially, we only need one agent to reach conclusions about asset pricing in competitive credit markets. Additionally, with the reduced form approach for the additional mechanisms against default such pricing becomes well tractable. Then, as we include enforcement mechanisms in addition to the seizure of collateral requirements, lenders may expect sufficiently large payments for their loans besides the value of the these requirements. In such situation, these additional mechanisms, instead of strengthening, actually weaken the restrictions that collateral places on borrowing. In fact, lenders anticipate that, even in case of default, they still receive more than just the value of the collateral guarantees. Thus, by non-arbitrage, they lend more than the value of these guarantees.
On the other end, borrowers have the incentive and the possibility to take new credits in order to pay their older ones, since there is no debt constraints or monitoring precluding agents to incur in a Ponzi scheme. Their behavior, then, leads to the non-existence of a physical feasible solution for the agent's problem.
Regarding the relationship found between the primitives of the economy, we may view it from two different perspectives. From the first one, given a level of effectiveness of the additional mechanisms, we show that there are strictly positive upper bounds for collateral requirements under which agents have incentives to indefinitely postpone their debts through new credits, leading to the non-existence of an optimal utility maximizing plan. Therefore, the market choice of collateral guarantees becomes relevant. From the second one, we provide theoretical foundations to the examples given by Páscoa and Seghir (2009). That is, given collateral requirements, we show that any sufficiently effective additional enforcement mechanism implies the non-existence of physical feasible individuals' optimal plans. Hence, it is the effectiveness of these mechanisms that brings the main result, not any mechanism per se.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an infinite horizon economy with assets subject to default and with effective enforcement mechanisms in addition to collateral repossession. In Section 3 we show our main result. Some extensions are discussed in Sections 4 and 5.
Model
Consider a discrete-time infinite-horizon economy with uncertainty and symmetric information.
Let S be the set of states of nature and F t the information available at period t ∈ T := N ∪ {0}.
F t is a partition of S, and if t ′ > t, make F t ′ finer than F t . Summarizing the uncertainty structure,
where a pair ξ := (t, σ) ∈ D is called a node and t(ξ) := t is the associated period of time. For simplicity, at t = 0 there is no information, that is F 0 := {S} and, therefore, there is only one node, which is denoted by ξ 0 .
Given ξ ∈ D, the set of its successors is given by the subtree D(ξ) := {µ ∈ D : µ ≥ ξ}. Also, for each
At each node ξ ∈ D there is a non-empty and finite set of commodities, L. These commodities may be traded in a competitive market at unitary prices p ξ = (p (ξ,l) ) l∈L ∈ R L + by a non-empty set of consumers. Also, at any node ξ > ξ 0 , there is a technology represented by a matrix with
+ be the aggregate physical resources up to node ξ, while W = (W ξ ) ξ∈D is the plan of such resources.
There is a finite set of real assets J(ξ) at each node ξ ∈ D. Each j in J(ξ) is short-lived, has promises A (µ,j) ∈ R L + at each node µ ∈ ξ + , and is traded in competitive markets by a unitary price q (ξ,j) ∈ R + . Since assets are subject to credit risk, borrowers are burdened to constitute physical collateral guarantees in order to limit lenders' losses. Particularly, for every unit of an asset j ∈ J(ξ) sold, borrowers must establish-and may consume-a bundle C (ξ,j) ∈ R L + \ {0} that is seized by the market in case of default. For the sake of notation, let J(
Furthermore, additional default enforcement mechanisms may exist. We allow generality in the type of additional enforcement mechanisms assuming that, for each unit of asset j ∈ J(ξ), borrowers pay, and lenders expect to receive, a fixed percentage of the remaining debt, λ (µ,j) ∈ [0, 1]. More formally, for every unit of asset j ∈ J(ξ), each borrower pays at each node µ ∈ ξ + an amount
where λ (µ,j) ∈ [0, 1] is the effectiveness of additional enforcement mechanisms on asset j at node µ, and, for any z ∈ R, [z] + := max{z, 0}.
Our approach allows us to include in our analysis economic (i.e. those induced by legal contracts) and non-economic (e.g. moral sanctions, loss of reputations) default enforcement mechanisms, provided that these mechanisms may be summarized by a family of parameters of effectiveness, (λ (µ,j) ) (µ,j)∈J + (D) . However, this last requirement do not induce loss of generality, since traders perfect foresee asset payments. In fact, we can always normalize financial payments as done above. 
+ be a bundle of autonomous consumption at node ξ (i.e. non-collateralized commodities). Also, define θ (ξ,j) and ϕ (ξ,j) as quantities of asset j ∈ J(ξ) purchased and sold at the same node. Given (p, q) ∈ Π := R D×L
given (p, q) ∈ Π, the objective of agent i is to maximize the utility of his consumption,
Enforcement mechanisms and the size of collateral bundles
In this section, we prove our main result: in contrast to the polar case studied by Araujo, Páscoa
and Torres-Martínez (2002), the market choice of collateral bundles becomes relevant when there are persistently effective additional enforcement mechanisms besides collateral repossession. To achieve our objective, we impose the following hypotheses. Proof. Assume that, for some (p, q) ∈ Π, there is a physically feasible solution for agent i's problem, denoted by (x i , θ i , ϕ i ) ∈ E. It follows from Lemma 1 (see Appendix) that there are, for every η ∈ D, multipliers γ i η ∈ R ++ and super-gradients v i η ∈ ∂u i η x i η + j∈J(η) C (η,j) ϕ i (η,j) such that, 4 for each asset j ∈ J(η), the following asset pricing conditions hold,
Also, the family of multipliers (γ i η ) η∈D can always be constructed to satisfy (see Lemma 1)
where c i η := x i η + j∈J(η) C (η,j) ϕ i η is the consumption bundle chosen by agent i at node η (the last inequality above follows from Assumption A2 jointly with the physical feasibility of agent i's consumption).
Using these properties, it is possible to find lower and upper bounds for deflated commodity prices. In fact, Assumption A1 and inequalities (5) ensure that, given (η, l) ∈ D × L,
.
On the other hand, given (η, l) ∈ D × L, it follows from inequality (3) that
where the last inequality follows from the strictly monotonicity of function u i η and, given l ∈ L, the vector e l ∈ R L is defined by: e (l,l ′ ) = 1 if l ′ = l, and equal to zero in other case.
Thus, for any (η, l) ∈ D × L,
For any η ∈ D, define π η = (π (η,l) ; l ∈ L). Under the assumptions on the statement of the Theorem, it follows that, for each η ∈ D(ξ), the number
is strictly positive. Therefore, suppose that, at each η ∈ D(ξ),
With this upper bound over unitary collateral bundles we conclude that, at every node η ∈ D(ξ) there exists j ∈ Ω(η) such that
Finally, using the Lemma 2 in the Appendix, we conclude that agent i's problem does not have a solution, contradicting the optimality of (x i , θ i , ϕ i ) ∈ E under prices (p, q) ∈ Π.
The result above has two properties that are worth being highlighted.
About upper bounds (Ψ η ) η∈D(ξ) . Regarding the upper bounds on collateral, we can see that, by construction, they depend only on the primitives of the economy and, for computational objectives, can be easily found. Additionally, these upper bounds (Ψ η ) η∈D may converge, when the time period goes to infinity, to any non-negative real number. We illustrate this property with the following example.
Consider an economy satisfying Assumptions A1 and A2, where there are only two commodities and there exists a plan (W t ) t≥0 ∈ R N ++ such that, for any ξ ∈ D, W ξ = W t(ξ) (1, 1) and W i ξ = σW ξ , with σ ∈ (0, 1). In other words, aggregate endowments are not affected by the uncertainty and agent i maintain along the event-tree a fixed portion of aggregate physical wealth. Also, there is only one asset at each node ξ ∈ D, and its promises at nodes µ ∈ ξ + are given by a constant bundle A = (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ R 2 ++ , i.e. it is a real promise that keep the consumption purchase power along the event-tree. Finally, agent i has additively separable utility with preferences at each node ξ ∈ D
, where the intertemporal discount factor β belongs to (0, 1), the probability to reach a node ξ, ρ(ξ), satisfies ρ(ξ) = µ∈ξ + ρ(µ), with ρ(ξ 0 ) = 1.
In this context, if additional enforcement mechanisms have a constant effectiveness of λ ∈ (0, 1) in a subtree D(ξ), then
Since β ∈ (0, 1), if the sequence (W t ) t≥0 is bounded from above and away from zero, then Ψ η goes to zero as t(η) goes to infinity. On the other hand, assume that (W t ) t≥0 decreases along the time following the recursive rule
where ϑ(0) = ϑ(1) = 2 and, for any t ≥ 2, ϑ(t) = t−1 k=1 2 k (t − k) + 2 t . Then, for any t ≥ 1, ϑ(t + 1) = 2(ϑ(t) + t), which implies that W t+1 = 1 W0 β 2t+2 W 2 t , ∀t ≥ 1. Therefore, Ψ η converges, when t(η) goes to infinity, to
it follows that,
Thus, the equation z = ζ(W 0 , a 2 ) has a solution for any z ∈ R ++ and, therefore, Ψ η may converge, as the period of time goes to infinite, to any positive real number.
Bounds on effectiveness. For convenience of notations, given µ ∈ D, define Ω + (µ) = {j ∈ J(µ − ) :
λ (µ,j) > 0}. Thus, for any ξ ∈ D: ∃µ ∈ ξ + such that j ∈ Ω + (µ) ⇔ j ∈ Ω(ξ).
Given collateral requirements, we can find lower bounds for the effectiveness on a subtree D(ξ),
then, independently of prices, and for any enforcement mechanism inducing such effectiveness, there is no physical feasible solution for the agents' problem. 5 These lower bounds are informative, i.e. λ µ ∈ (0, 1), only for collateral requirements that are not high enough. In fact, for larger collateral requirements there is no default and, therefore, the market price of collateral requirements is always greater that the loan value.
On endogenous effectiveness
A key feature of our model is that we assume that the amount of payments besides the collateral guarantees is independent of the borrowers and does not depend on the history of default. This assumption allowed us to identify sold with purchased assets. Implicitly, we pool the debt contracts into derivatives following a trivial securitization, that is, by identifying prices and payments of debt markets with those of investment markets. However, our analysis may be extended for equilibrium models in which the effectiveness of payment enforcement mechanisms is an endogenous and personalized variable.
For instance, we may suppose that the access to credit markets depend on previous payments.
That is, consider a dynamic infinite horizon general equilibrium model in which, at any state of nature, and for every agent, the access to credit securities depend on the history of default. Thus, in this new framework, for default penalties sufficiently restrictive on the access of credit markets, there may be endogenous incentives inducing borrowers to deliver payments larger than the depreciated value of collateral requirements. Also, suppose that financial markets still preserve some features from our original model. That is, each type of credit contract is securitized into only one derivative, primitive and derivative prices are identified, and lenders perfectly foresee the payments of derivatives. Specifically for this last feature, suppose that, in case of default, agents advance any payment in addition to the depreciated collateral as a percentage of the remaining debt, facing payment functions with an analogous specification of our (F (µ,j) ) (µ,j)∈J + (D) . 5 Using the same arguments in the proof of the Theorem, it is sufficient to take, for each η ∈ µ + , with µ ≥ ξ,
In this new context, under hypotheses on individual' characteristics analogous to Assumptions
A1-A2, there are two conditions under which our Theorem still holds:
(i) For any plan of prices, individual optimal allocations satisfy inequalities analogous to (3)-(5);
(ii) At the moment of the credit operation, borrowers are only required to constitute the associated collateral requirements.
In fact, assume that additional enforcement mechanisms are persistently effective in a sub-event tree. If there is a physical feasible optimal allocation, using the same arguments of the proof of our theorem, condition (i) implies that if collateral requirements are not high enough, then unitary loan prices persistently exceed the associated collateral value. Thus, by condition (ii), the agent may improve his respective utility increasing borrowing along the event-tree. A contradiction.
Therefore, a natural question arises. When does an economy satisfy conditions (i) and (ii)?
Regarding condition (i), it follows from Lemma 2 that any convex model satisfies it. 6 However, some enforcement mechanisms may induce non-convex budget sets. Even in these cases, condition (i) still holds if these non-convexities involve only the borrowers' deliveries. 7 On the other hand, condition (ii) holds unless there is some restriction on the short sales in addition to collateral requirements.
Other extensions
Long-lived and infinite-lived real assets.
Our analysis also holds when long-lived real assets are available for trading. Essentially, nonarbitrage conditions associated to individual's problem (Lemma 1 in the Appendix) are still valid (see Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2008) for detailed arguments).
About persistent effectiveness.
In our main result, we assume that additional enforcement mechanisms are effective in a subtree D(ξ). However, it is possible to weaken this assumption, requiring only effectiveness in a infinite path along the event-tree. For this, we need some definitions.
Given k ∈ N ∪ {+∞}, a path of uncertainty is a set (µ n ; n ∈ N, n ≤ k) ⊂ D in which every µ n+1 is an immediate successor of µ n , for each n < k. A set B ⊂ D does not have finite paths when for any µ ∈ B there exists η ∈ B such that η ∈ µ + . Additional enforcement mechanisms are persistently effective in a path of uncertainty Θ, if for any µ ∈ Θ, there is j ∈ J(µ − ) on which additional enforcement mechanisms are effective at µ. For any path of uncertainty Θ := (µ n ; n ∈ N) 6 We mean that a model is convex when agents' objective functions are concave and, for each vector of prices, budget sets are convex. 7 Technically, in this case, the arguments in the proof of Lemma 1 can be remade by redefining the truncated problem (P i,T ) in such form that, for any η ∈ D T , variables ϕη are fixed and equal to the optimal choices ϕ i η . 
Also, the plan of multipliers (γ i η ) η∈D satisfy
Consider the optimization problem: where the inequality g i η (z η , z η − ; p, q) ≤ 0 represents the budget constraint at node η, that is, inequality (1) or (2), and given (x, y) ∈ R m × R m , the interval [x, y] := {z ∈ R m : ∃a ∈ [0, 1], z = ax + (1 − a)y}. It follows from the existence of an optimal individual plan at prices (p, q) that there exists a solution for (P i,T ), namely (z i,T η ) η∈D T . 10 Given η ∈ D, define the concave function ν i η :
, where z η = (x η , θ η , ϕ η ). It follows that, for any
Given T ∈ N, for each η ∈ D T −1 , define the set Ξ T (η) as the family of allocations (x η , θ η , ϕ η ) ∈ Z(η)
that satisfies x η + j∈J(η) C (η,j) ϕ (η,j) ≤ 2W η . Also, for any η ∈ D T , let Ξ T (η) be the set of
. It follows from Rockafellar (1997, Theorem 28.3) , that there exist non-negative multipliers (γ i,T η ) η∈D T such that the following saddle point property holds,
and γ i,T η g i η (z i,T η , z i,T η− ; p, q) = 0. 10 In fact, define a new problem (P i,T ),
Under Assumption A2 the objective function on (P i,T ) is continuous, and the set of admissible allocations is compact in Q η∈D T Z(η). Note that, to ensure this it is necessary to have non-zero collateral requirements, otherwise, long and short positions are unbounded.
Thus, there is a solution (z i,T η ) η∈D T . Moreover, this solution for (P i,T ) is also an optimal choice for (P i,T ). Essentially, the existence of a finite optimum at prices (p, q) for the agent i's problem ensure that, when q (η,j) = 0, the payments F (µ,j) (pµ) must be equal zero, for each µ ∈ η + . Thus, when q (η,j) = 0, choosing positives amounts of θ (η,j) does not induce any gains. 11 Note that, otherwise, agent i improve his utility in D choosing the allocation (z i,T η ) η∈D T in the sub-tree D T , without making any (physical or financial) trade after the nodes with date T .
Claim. For each µ ∈ D, the sequence (γ i,T µ ) T ≥t(µ) is bounded. Moreover, given T > t(µ), for any plan a µ ∈ Ξ T (µ) we have that
where, for any η ∈ D, the vector (∇ 1 g i η (p, q), ∇ 2 g i η (p, q)) is defined by
Proof. Given t ≤ T , substitute the following allocation in inequality (9)
We have:
Assumptions A1 ensure that, for each η ∈ D, min l∈L W i (η,l) > 0. Also, Assumption A2 implies that l∈L p (η,l) > 0, guaranteing that, for each µ ∈ D, the sequence (γ i,T µ ) T >t(µ) is bounded. On the other hand, given (z η ) η∈D T ∈ Ξ T , using (9), we have that
Thus, fix µ ∈ D T −1 and a µ ∈ Ξ T (µ). If we evaluate inequality above in
we obtain
Since functions (g i ξ (· ; p, q); ξ ∈ D) are affine, we have
Also, budget feasibility of (z i η ) η∈D at prices (p, q), jointly with monotonicity of preferences, ensure that, −p µ ω i µ + ∇ 2 g i µ (p, q) · z i µ − = −∇ 1 g i µ (p, q) · z i µ ,
Therefore,
Using (11), we conclude the proof. ⊠
Since D is countable and, for any node η, the sequence (γ i,T η ) T ≥t(η) is bounded, using Tychonoff Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border (1999 where, as we said above, the last equation follows from the strictly monotonicity of u i η . Moreover, taking the limit as T goes to infinity in inequality (10) we obtain that
Therefore, equation (8) follows.
Since for any η ∈ D, Ξ s1 (η) = Ξ s2 (η) when min{s 1 , s 2 } > t(η), it follows from the inequality in the statement of Claim above, taking the limit as T goes to infinity, that where z η = (x η , θ η , ϕ η ) ∈ R L × R J(η) × R J(η) . Since the plan (z i η ) η∈D is physically feasible, there exists a neighborhood V of z i η such that δ Z2(η) (b) = 0 for every b ∈ V . Then, we have that ∂δ Z2(η) (z i η ) = {0}. Also, it follows by Theorem 23.8 and 23.9 in Rockafellar (1997) , that there exists v i η ∈ ∂u i η (c i η ) and κ i η ∈ ∂δ Z(η) (x i η , θ i η , ϕ i η ) such that (14) γ i η ∇ 1 g i η (p, q) + µ∈η + γ i µ ∇ 2 g i µ (p, q) = (v i η , 0, (C (η,j) v i η ) j∈J(η) ) + κ i η .
It follows that (x ξ , θ ξ , ϕ ξ ) ξ∈D is budget feasible at prices (p, q). Moreover, equations above show that Ponzi schemes are possible at prices (p, q). In fact, agent i increases his borrowing at ξ and pays his future commitments by using new credit. It follows that (x ξ , θ ξ , ϕ ξ ) ξ∈D improves the utility level of agent i, contradicting the optimality of (x i , θ i , ϕ i ).
